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Mean-field Game Approach to Admission Control of an M/M/∞ Queue
with Decreasing Congestion Cost
Piotr Więcek∗, Eitan Altman†, Arnob Ghosh⋄
Abstract— We study a mean field approximation of the
M/M/∞ queuing system. The problem we deal with is quite
different from standard games of congestion as we consider
the case in which higher congestion results in smaller costs per
user. This is motivated by a situation in which some TV show
is broadcast so that the same cost is needed no matter how
many users follow the show. Using a mean-field approximation,
we show that this results in multiple equilibria of threshold
type which we explicitly compute. We show that the mean-field
approximation becomes tight as the workload increases, thus
the results obtained for the mean-field model well approximate
the discrete one.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is devoted to the problem of whether an arrival
should queue or not in an M/M/∞ queue. It is assumed that
the cost per customer decreases in the number of customers.
In a wireless context, the M/M/∞ queue may model the
number of calls in a cell with a large capacity. The asumption
that the cost per call decreases in the number of calls is
typical for multicast in which the same content is broadcast
to all mobiles, so that the cost of the transmission can be
shared among the number of calls present.
Our objective in this paper is to study the structure of
individually optimal policies. We obtain threshold policies
in which an individual is admitted if the number of ongoing
calls exceeds some threshold. This is exactly the opposite to
what is optimal in most of the queuing models.
The reason behind it is that the assumption on the cost
in this problem is quite different than that in standard
congestion control problem, since the larger the number of
customers, the lower the cost per customer is. The structure
of individually optimal policies can thus be expected to be
quite different than those obtained when congestion costs
per customer increase. These have been studied for over
half a century starting with the seminal paper of Pinhas
Naor [8]. Naor had considered an M/M/1 queue, in which
a controller has to decide whether arrivals should enter a
queue or not. The objective was to minimize a weighted
difference between the average expected waiting time of
those that enter, and the acceptance rate of customers. Naor
then considers the individual optimal threshold (which can
be viewed as a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game
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between the players) and shows that it is also of a threshold
type with a threshold larger than in a centralized model.
Under individual optimality, arrivals that join the queue
wait longer in average than in the global optimization case.
Finally, he showed that there exists some toll such that if it is
imposed on arrivals for joining the queue, then the threshold
value of the individually optimal policy can be made to
agree with the socially optimal one. Since this seminal work
of Naor there has been a huge amount of research that
extend the model. More general interarrival and service times
have been considered, more general networks, other objective
functions and other queueing disciplines, see e.g. [14], [12],
[11], [6], [7], [3], [5], [1], [10], [2] and references therein.
We study here a simplified mean field limit of the M/M/∞
queuing system rather than the actual discrete model since,
on one hand it is much simpler to handle and solve than the
original discrete problem (we obtain closed-form formulas
for all the equilibria) and, on the other the approximation
becomes tight as the workload increases. To show that, in
the paper we establish the convergence of the game to its
mean field limit under appropriate conditions.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in Section
2 we introduce both the discrete model and its mean-field
approximation. In Section 3 we find equilibria of the mean-
field model. In Section 4 we establish the convergence
of discrete models to the mean-field one as the workload
increases. In Section 5 we numerically illustrate our results.
We end the paper with concluding remarks in Section 6.
II. THE MODEL
A. Discrete Model
We consider a service facility in which an arriving cus-
tomer can observe the length of the queue upon arrival Xt
(the system state). The value of service is γ and the cost of
spending time in service can be computed as an integral
of the cost function c over the service time with c – a
continuous decreasing function of the number of users in
the queue. An arriving customer can either join the queue
or leave without being served. The decision is made upon
arrival. The situation is modeled as a M/M/∞ system with
incoming rate λ and service rate µ.
A customer k arriving at time tk chooses whether to enter
the queue (E) or not (N ). It follows that the set of pure
actions for any customer is V = {E,N}. Since the decision
that he makes is based on the length of the queue, a policy
(or a strategy) of any customer will be a mapping1 πk :
1For any finite set A, ∆(A) denotes the set of all probability measures
on A.
S → ∆(V ) (since the set V is only a two-point set, we
will identify πk with a function from N to [0, 1], describing
the probability it assigns to action E), where S denotes the
set of possible system states (in the discrete model S = N).
In what will follow we will assume that the users limit their
policies to the sets of so-called impulse or threshold policies,
defined below.
Definition 1 A policy πk of a user is called an impulse
policy if
(a) it is discontinuous in finitely many points;
(b) it is constant on each interval between two discontuity
points2.
A subclass of the set of impulse policies with very simple
structure are threshold policies.






0 if x < Θ
q if x = Θ
1 if x > Θ
(1)
At time t, an incoming client who employs this policy joins
the system if the queue length, Xt, is bigger than Θ, while
if Xt = Θ he does so with probability q. Otherwise he never
joins the queue.






where σk is user k’s service time.
For each multi-policy π = (π1, π2, . . .), let [π
−k | π′k] be
the policy which replaces πk by π
′
k in π. Now we are ready
to define the solution we will be looking for:
Definition 3 A policy πk is an optimal response for user k


















2 , . . .) is a Nash equilibrium if policy of every user
k is the optimal response for user k against π∗, for every
k. If inequalities (2) are true up to some ε > 0, we say that
π
∗ is an ε-Nash equilibrium.
B. Fluid Model
In what follows we will mostly analyze the fluid approxi-
mation, which can be viewed as the weak limit of the system
(scaled in a proper way) as the arrival rate of players goes to
infinity (see e.g. [13]). Below we describe the fluid model.
The system state (the length of the queue) belongs to S =
R
+. Consequently, the policies of the players are defined on
R
+. The customers arrive at the queue according to a fluid
2In case S = N, assumption (a) is trivially satisfied, but together with
(b) it implies that the policy changes its value only in finitely many points.
process with rate λ. As each of them uses some policy πk,
the real incoming rate at time t is π(Xt)λ where π(Xt) is
the average strategy of the arriving users. They stay in the
queue an exponentially distributed time with parameter µ,
and so the outflow is according to a fluid process with rate
µXt. This can be described as the following ODE:
{ .
Xt(π) = π(Xt)λ− µXt(π), ∀t ≥ 0
X0 = x0
(3)
Since there are infinitely many players in the game, we
encounter problems with defining the multi-policies now. For
that reason we assume that in multi-policy π all the players
use the same policy π. If we want to write that only one
player, say player k changes his policy to some π′k, we write
that players apply policy [π−k, π′k], meaning that each player
uses policy π except player k. The assumption that all the
players except possibly one use the same policy may look
unrealistic, but it is enough to define and find an equilibrium
in such a symmetric model. Moreover, π is not always well
defined, but in such a case π(Xt) ≡ π(Xt). Also with these
assumptions, both the cost and the equilibrium can be defined
as in the discrete model.
III. EQUILIBRIA OF THE FLUID MODEL
In this section we characterize the equilibrium points of
our game. We begin by characterizing the evolution of the
system state in case all the users apply the same impulse
policy.
Lemma 1 Suppose all the players (except maybe one) apply
the same impulse policy π. Then if the initial state of the
system is x0, then Xt is continuous in t for any x0 and is
nondecreasing in x0.
Proof: It is clear that for π ≡ π having finitely
many discontinuity points, the (non-classical) solution to the
equation (3) is well-defined a.e. and continuous in t.
Next, suppose that x0 < x
′
0 and there exists a s such
that3 Xs[x0] > Xs[x
′
0]. Xt is continuous in t, thus by
the intermediate value property there exists a t∗ < s such
that Xt∗ [x0] = Xt∗ [x
′
0]. But in both cases and at each
time all users apply the same policy π, depending only
on the current state of the system, thus for any t > t∗
Xt[x0] = Xt[x
′
0], which is a contradiction, as we assumed
that Xs[x0] > Xs[x
′
0].
We have one immediate corollary to this lemma.
Corollary 1 The expected cost of a player joining the queue







3We shall write Xt[x0] for the value at t of the solution to (3) when
X0 = x0.
when σk ∼ Exp(µ), is decreasing in Xtk .
4
Note that in the above corollary we have replaced x0 with
Xtk . This is justified, as the coefficients of (3) depend on t
only through Xt. Corollary 1 has an important consequence
which is stated in the lemma below:
Lemma 2 Any best response to a symmetric impulse multi-
strategy π is a threshold strategy. Moreover, the best re-
sponse is unique up to the value of q (see (1)).
Proof: A player k arriving at time tk has only two pure
actions: to enter the queue (E) or not to enter the queue (N ).







with σk ∼ Exp(µ), which is by Corollary 1 decreasing in
Xtk . On the other hand, when k uses action N , his cost is 0.
Thus, if k prefers to use action E for Xtk = x1, he will also
prefer it for Xtk = x2 > x1. Similarly, if he prefers to use
N for Xtk = x2, he will also prefer it for Xtk = x1 < x2.
Finally, as the cost of using E is strictly decreasing in Xtk ,
there may only exist one point where k is indifferent between
E and N and so he may choose to randomize. Moreover, in
any other point the best response is uniquely determined.
An immediate, but very important consequence of Lemma
2 is the following:
Corollary 2 In any symmetric5 equilibrium to our queuing
game any player uses a threshold policy.
Remark 1 Note that the equilibrium specifies the action to
take at any state, including states that are in practice never
reached. If a state x is never visited then any variation of
the equilibrium at states larger than x will not change the
performance of any player. Yet since we allow for any initial
state, there may be customers that will find the system at
states that are transient and will not be visited again. There-
fore specifying the equililbrium in such states is considered
to be important in game theory. Equilibria that are specified
in all states including transient ones, are known as perfect
equilibria. It can also be shown that such equilibria are good
approximations of those that we obtain in case that there
is some sufficiently small constant uncontrolled inflow. This
follows from [4].
Assuming that all (except maybe one) users apply the same
[Θ, q]-threshold strategy, we may write explicitly what is the
evolution of the system state Xt:
4The fact that we have strong monotonicity here, even though we had
weak monotonicity in Lemma 1, is a consequence of the continuity of Xt,
which implies that a trajectory starting at time tk in a larger Xtk stays
above the one starting in a smaller X′tk on some interval, which affects the
integral in (4).
5The result can be generalized to the nonsymmetric case, but it would
require some technical assumptions to make sure π is well-defined.
Lemma 3 Suppose the initial state of the system is x0 and
that all the users (except maybe one) apply the [Θ, q]-
threshold policy. Then the system state at time t can be
explicitly written as:
(a) If x0 > Θ and Θ ≤
λ
µ
























)e−µt if t ∈ [0, t(x0,µ)]
























Proof: We know that when p is a constant, the solution
of the equation
{ .














cally when t → ∞. Thus, if x0 > Θ and
λ
µ
> Θ, Xt never









Similarly, note that for p = 0, Xt decreases monotonically
to 0, thus when x0 < Θ, Xt never leaves the region where
policy π prescribes to use action N , and so (5) reduces to
Xt = x0e
−µt.
Now suppose that x0 > Θ >
λ
µ
. Then Xt starts in the region
where π prescribes to use action E with probability one,
which implies that its trajectory decreases towards λ
µ
until
time t(x0,Θ) when it reaches the threshold Θ. From then on
π prescribes to use action N with probability 1. It is easy to








Since by definition t(x0,Θ) is such that Xt(x0,Θ)
= Θ, we









. Then, for t ≥
t(x0,Θ), Xt has to satisfy (5) with p = 0 and t0 = t(x0,Θ)
instead of 0, which gives
Xt = Θe
µ(t(x0,Θ)−t).




, by (5) Xt ≡
qλ
µ








, Xt moves downwards and for t > 0 behaves like
when x0 < Θ.
Now, to simplify the notation, we will make use of the
fact that all the players use threshold policies. Let us define
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))
to be the expected service cost for player k if he enters the
queue when its state is x and all the players except k apply
a [Θ−k, q−k]-threshold policy. Ĉk can be written as
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))












The following lemma gives exact ways to compute Ĉk in
each of the cases of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Ĉk can be computed using following formulas:
(a) If x > Θ−k and Θ−k ≤
λ
µ





















































In next two lemmas we characterize the best responses to
any given threshold strategies.
Lemma 5 [Θk, qk]-threshold policy is a best response of
player k to a [Θ−k, q−k]-threshold policy used by all the
others if Θk is obtained by finding the unique solution to the
equation
Ĉk(Θk, (Θ−k, q−k)) = γ. (6)
6In the degenerate case when x = λ
µ









which is the limit of the expression in (a) when x → λ
µ
. We will use




f(u) du = f(a),
if needed. This will reduce the number of cases considered in subsequent
results, without affecting the validity of any of them.
and taking any qk. If equation (6) has no solutions then Θk
is taken as the only value such that
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) < γ for x > Θk and (7)
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) > γ for x < Θk (8)
and qk = 1 if the first inequality is satisfied for x = Θk,
while qk = 0 if the second one is satisfied for x = Θk.
Proof: First note that Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))−γ is exactly
the expected cost of player k if he joins the queue when
its state is x, while his cost when he does not join is 0.
Moreover, the expected cost of player joining the queue is
by Corollary 1 monotone decreasing function of x. Thus,
equation (6) may have at most one solution, and the cost of
joining the queue for x > Θk is negative, that for x < Θk is
positive, while that for x = Θk is 0, regardless of qk. Thus
[Θk, qk]-threshold policy always gives player k the smallest
cost available.
Similarly, when (6) has no solutions, from the monotonic-
ity of the cost Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))−γ, there must exist exactly
one Θk such that Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))−γ > 0 for x < Θk and
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k))− γ < 0 for x > Θk. Now we can repeat
the arguments from the proof of the first part of the lemma,
to show that [Θk, 1]- or [Θk, 0]-threshold policy is the best
response to [Θ−k, q−k]-threshold policy of the others in this
case.
Lemma 6 Let [Θk, qk]-threshold policy be a best response
of player k to a [Θ−k, q−k]-threshold policy used by all the












c(u) du = γ. (9)
Then Θk and qk satisfy the following:






then Θk = ∞ and qk is
arbitrary (which means that the best response is a policy
never prescribing to enter the queue).
































< Θ−k < Θ
Θ, for Θ−k ≥ Θ
where Θ̃ is some function defined on (λ
µ
,Θ) satisfying























































) = µγ or Θ



















7If there are any solutions.














Θ−k, for Θ−k ≤ Θ
Θ, for Θ−k ≥ Θ.



















































(d) If γ ≥ 1
µ
c(0) then Θk = 0 and qk = 1 (which means
that the best response is a policy always prescribing to
enter the queue).
Proof: To show (a) first note that any form of Ĉk





limu→∞ c(u), as c is a strictly decreasing
function. Thus, in case γ ≤ 1
µ
limu→∞ c(u), also γ <
Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) for any value of x, thus (7) is satisfied
for Θk = ∞. This means that the strategy never prescribing
player k to enter the queue is his best response to the
[Θ−k, q−k]-threshold policy used by all the others.
Now suppose the assumptions of part (b) of the lemma



























, there exists an x such that















and limx→∞ C(x) = limu→∞ c(u). Thus, again












, there exists an
x such that C(x) = γ, which is how Θ is defined.
Moreover, Θ is always larger than λ
µ
.
Next note that by Lemma 4, Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) equals
C(x) if x > Θ−k and Θ−k ≤
λ
µ


























Θ−k ≤ Θ and Θk = Θ for Θ−k ≥ Θ. The values of
qk for Θ−k ≤
λ
µ




: If the former is smaller, for Θk = Θ−k we
are in the set where Ĉk(Θk, (Θ−k, q−k)) = C(Θk) < γ,
and so qk = 1. If Θ−k =
q−kλ
µ
, we are in the set where
Ĉk(Θk, (Θ−k, q−k)) =
1
µ
c(Θ−k), thus according to Lemma








, Ĉk(Θk, (Θ−k, q−k)) = C(Θk) > γ, and so
qk = 0.
To finish the proof of part (b) of the Lemma, we need






, Θk > Θ−k. To do





, Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) is continuous at x = Θ−k
as a function of x. If it is, then from the fact that for
x = Θ−k, Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) = C(x) > γ, also Ĉk(x +
ε, (Θ−k, q−k)) > γ for some ε > 0, and thus Θk de-







and take xn → Θ
+





















= C(Θ−k) = Ĉk(Θ−k, (Θ−k, q−k)),
which proves the desired property.












, the equation C(x) = γ has
no solutions. Moreover, its LHS is always smaller than its










0 c(u) du, by the intermediate value property






Next, again by Lemma 4, Ĉk(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) equals C(x) if
x > Θ−k and Θ−k ≤
λ
µ




if x < Θ−k or x = Θ−k >
q−kλ
µ
, and thus by Lemma 5,
Θk = Θ−k for Θ−k ≤ Θ and Θk = Θ for Θ−k > Θ. The
choice of qk is made exactly as in part (b) of the lemma.
Finally, suppose that γ ≥ 1
µ
c(0). Then for any value of
x, Ĉ(x, (Θ−k, q−k)) < γ, and thus the optimal response of
player k to the [Θ−k, q−k]-threshold strategy of all the others
is always to join the queue.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 The game under consideration always has a
symmetric equilibrium where each of the players uses the
same [Θ, q]-threshold strategy. Moreover:






then the equilibrium is
unique, with Θ = ∞, which means that the equilibrium
policies prescribe every user never to enter the queue.












infinitely many equilibria, whose forms depend on the
relation between Θ and λ
µ
:
(b1) If Θ < λ
µ
then there are equilibria of five types:
Θ = Θ and any q > Θµ
λ
; Θ = Θ∗, with Θ∗ satisfying
c(Θ∗) = µγ and q = Θ
∗µ
λ













(b2) If Θ = λ
µ
then either Θ = Θ and q ∈ {0, 1} or
Θ = Θ and q is any number from [0, 1].
(b3) If Θ > λ
µ
then either Θ = Θ and q is an arbitrary
number from [0, 1] or Θ = λ
µ
and q = 0.











then there are infinitely
many equilibria of three types: with Θ ∈ [0,Θ] and q =
0; with Θ ∈ [0,Θ] and q = 1; with Θ = Θ∗ satisfying




(d) If γ ≥ 1
µ
c(0) then the equilibrium is unique, with Θ = 0
and q = 1, which means that the equilibrium policies
prescribe every user to always enter the queue.
Proof: A strategy for any player k will induce a
symmetric equilibrium if it is a best response to itself. Below
we analyze which strategies may satisfy this condition.
In case (a) it is obvious by (a) of Lemma 6 that the
policy prescribing never to join the queue is always the best
response to itself, and since this is the only best response to
any policy, this is the only possible equilibrium.







or equal to Θ. In the latter case it is clear that for any q the
[Θ, q]-threshold policy will be the best response to itself. In
the former one, q and Θ must satisfy one of the following
conditions:
q = 0 and Θ > qλ
µ






, so [Θ, 0]-threshold policies form equilibria in
this case.




, and so [Θ, 1]-threshold policies

















) < γµ, which is always
true as long as Θ < λ
µ
.
Θ = Θ < qλ
µ
, which implies that q > Θµ
λ
. It can always be
satisfied when Θ is as assumed, so [Θ, q]-threshold policies








and c(Θ) = µγ. Note however that by the
definition of Θ and continuity of c, if Θ < λ
µ
then there must






Θ∗ and q = Θ
∗µ
λ
is an equilibrium. In particular, if Θ = λ
µ
,
then also Θ∗ = λ
µ
and q = 1 is one.
In case (c) Θ has to be in interval [0,Θ] and needs to be
related to q in one of the following ways:
q = 0 and Θ > qλ
µ
= 0 or Θ = 0 with c(0) > µγ, which is
always true in case (c).




, which is always true, as Θ ≤ Θ <
λ
µ
in this case, which was shown in the proof of Lemma 6.
Θ = qλ
µ
≤ Θ and c(Θ) = µγ. Note however that by the
definition of Θ and continuity of c, there must exist some




is the only equilibrium in this case.
Finally, in case (d), by (d) of Lemma 6 it is obvious that
the policy always prescribing to join the queue is the best
response to itself. Since this is the only best response to any
policy in this case, this is the only possible equilibrium. This
ends the proof of the theorem.
Remark 2 It should be noted here that there are multiple
equilibria in certain situations. In that case, it is normally
not clear which one would prevail. Nevertheless, as the cost
of being served is a decreasing function of Θ and of q for
a fixed value of Θ, we may assume that the customers will
naturally choose the equilibrium strategies with the biggest
values of Θ and q.
IV. APPROXIMATION OF THE DISCRETE MODEL
In the section below we present a result which joins the
equilibria of the fluid model with ǫ-equilibria of the discrete
model when the incoming rate is high. To formulate it, we
need to introduce some additional notation, differentiating
between the discrete and the fluid model. Let us start with
fixing that the function c and parameters λ and µ define the
fluid model, whose state will be denoted by Xt. Then let







incoming rate λn = nλ and service rate µ. The state in







will be its normalized state. Using this notation we can
formulate the main result of this section and its proof.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the initial (normalized) state of
the queue x0 ∈ [0, xmax] for some fixed xmax and that the
user k plays against [Θ, q]-threshold policies of all the others
(denoted shortly as π policies) in the fluid model with service
cost c, incoming rate λ and service rate µ. Then for any
ε > 0 there exists an N such that for any n ≥ N his expected











where πn denotes a [nΘ, q]-threshold policy (which is a
proper rescaling of policy π to fit Mn), differs from the
expected cost E [Ck(Xt(π))] in the fluid model by at most ε.






0, when x < n(Θ− β)
x−n(Θ−β)
nβ
, when x ∈ [n(Θ− β), nΘ]






0, when x < nΘ
x−nΘ
nβ
, when x ∈ [nΘ, n(Θ + β)]
1, when x > n(Θ + β)
.






0, when x < Θ− β
x−Θ+β
β
, when x ∈ [Θ− β,Θ]







0, when x < Θ
x−Θ
β
, when x ∈ [Θ,Θ+ β]
1, when x > Θ+ β
.
These policies differ from [Θ, q]-threshold policy π only on
sets (Θ − β,Θ) or (Θ,Θ + β) respectively. Next, consider
equation (3) when all the players apply policy πβ . It can be
directly computed that the solution Xt(π
β) has the following
properties:
1) Xt(π
β) → Xt(π) pointwise as β → 0.
2) Whenever Xt(π
β) 6∈ (Θ − β,Θ), it is of the form
Xt(π
β) = D1e
−µt + D2 for some constants D1, D2




































∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ+ µΘ.
Properties (ii) and (iii) clearly imply that
Xt(π








, independent of β. Thus all
the functions Xt(π
β) are equicontinuous (as functions of t).
Next, we can find Tε such that





β) are equicontinuous and converging to
Xt(π), by the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem Xt(π
β) converges to
Xt(π) uniformly on interval [0, Tε]. On the other hand, c
is continuous, decreasing and bounded, thus it is uniformly
continuous, which means that there exists a δ > 0 such that
for any x, y such that |x − y| < δ we have |c(x) − c(y)| <
ε
8Tε
. Using uniform convergence of Xt(π
β) we can further













β)| ≥ δ] ≤ De−nF (δ)




∈ (0,∞). By this last property, the probability
bounded above converges to zero as n goes to infinity at rate
of e−n, so for n large enough this probability is not larger
than ε8Tεc(0) .







































where the last inequality is a consequence of (10), (11), (12)
and the bound on the probability that X̃nt (π
β,n) and Xt(π
β)
differ by more than δ (recall that c(0) is the biggest value
of c)
Now we can repeat all the above considerations for poli-












To complete the proof note that Xnt (π
β,n), Xnt (π) and
Xnt (π
β,n) are birth-death processes starting at the same x0,
with the same death rate, but with increasing birth rates. As
a consquence Xnt (π
β,n) is for any t ≥ 0 stochastically dom-
inated by Xnt (π), which in turn is stochastically dominated
by Xnt (π




































This, together with (14) and (15) implies the theorem.
Using Theorem 2 we can immediately show that all the
results proved for the mean-field model can be viewed as
good approximations of what happens in the discrete case
when service rates go to infinity.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Here we numerically evaluate NE strategy profile in our
setting for some special class of cost functions c(·). We





where a > 0. It is easy to discern that c(·) is strictly
decreasing with u.










which gives after some Algebra
Θ̄ = −
LambertW(−γµ(a+ ρ)e−γµ(a+ρ)) + γµa
γµ
(17)
Since from (17) the minimum value of the argument of
LambertW function can be −e−1, thus Θ̄ is always real
valued.













In order to solve the above equation, we use the matlab
function fsolve.












) = 0.2503 (18)
Now, we are ready to state formally all the possible NE




= 0.5, then Θ = 0 and q = 1. Thus, players
will always enter the queue.
2) γ ∈ [0.2503, 0.5), then there are infinitely many equi-
libria which are of the following types:
a) Θ ∈ [0,Θ], q = 0.







3) γ ∈ (0, 0.2503), then there are infinitely many equilib-
ria, which are of the following types:
a) If Θ̄ < ρ, (which occurs when γ >
1
7
) then there are
five types of equilibria:









• Θ, q ∈ [0, 1]
• Θ ∈ [Θ̄, ρ], q = 0.
• Θ ∈ [Θ̄, ρ], q = 1.




Θ = Θ̄ and q ∈ {0, 1} or Θ and q ∈ [0, 1]8




Θ = Θ, q ∈ [0, 1] or Θ = ρ and q = 0.
Figure 1 shows the variation of Θ and the lowest possible
threshold value of NE strategy profile with γ. From the above
characterization of NE, it is easy to discern that the lower
threshold value is max{min{Θ̄, ρ}, 0} i.e. there is no NE
with the threshold value lower than the above value. On the
upper threshold is always given by Θ i.e. there is no NE with
the threshold value higher than Θ. Note that lower threshold
value goes to 0 at γ = 0.2503 and the upper threshold value
goes to 0 at γ = 0.5.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a mean field limit of the M/M/∞ queuing
system. It proved to be much simpler to handle and solve
8In this case Θ = 1.4966
Fig. 1. Variation of Θ and Lower Threshold value with γ
than the original discrete problem. We obtained closed-form
formulas for all equilibria in the model. Finally, we have
shown that the mean-field approximation becomes tight as
the workload increases, thus the results obtained can be
viewed as good approximations of what happens in the
original discrete model.
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